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questioned whether the daily newspaper published by the plaintiff in the
instant case suffered harm under any of these tests, since its claim upon
public interest is merely temporary. Nevertheless, the court had difficult
issues of fact before it and acted correctly in reserving to the plaintiff the
right of cross-examination and other safeguards given in a trial for the
purpose of determining the facts. N. B. K.
EVDECE-INFER-NCE UPON AN INFMaENC-[Missouri] .- Plaintiff sued
defendant insurance company on a double indemnity, or accidental death
benefit, provision in a life insurance policy. Plaintiff contended that the
insured died as a result of an accidental fall from a stepladder which caused
a rupture of the spleen. Although there were no eyewitnesses to the fall,
there was evidence to the effect that on the night of the alleged accident,
the insured had been putting up colored bulbs in front of his house with
the aid of a stepladder. The stepladder was found the next day with one
of the legs broken off. A splinter of wood, allegedly from the ladder, was
taken out of the insured's leg. Plaintiff testified that on the day after the
fall, insured showed her bruises on his chest, over his heart, and on his
leg and that there were also bruises along his left side, and discoloration
over his abdomen. Insured's doctor testified, that in his opinion, insured
died as a result of a rupture of the spleen. Insured had been active, ener-
getic, and in apparent good health for some time prior to the injury. De-
fendant contended that the evidence presented was insufficient; that plain-
tiff could not establish her case without building an inference upon an
inference, which defendant contended was not permitted. Held: That the
rule against building an inference upon an inference has been modified to
the extent that it is now permitted in order to arrive at a conclusion, so
long as the result is not too remote. Krug v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of
New York. 2
Until very recently, the Missouri court has refused to recognize that an
inference might be based upon an inference in order to prove an ultimate
fact.3 Rather, it has invariably said that the "piling" of inferences would
not be permitted. On the other hand, there seems to have been no limit to
1. The defendant contended that plaintiff must show (1) that insured
-was standing on the ladder on the particular night, (2) while thereon he
was caused to fall by the accidental breaking of the ladder, (3) that he
sustained bodily injuries as a result of the breaking of the ladder and the
lall, (4) that the bodily injuries were evidenced by visible contusions or
wounds on the body as required by the insurance policy, and (5) that as a
result of such bodily injuries, and independently and exclusively of all other
causes, the insured died. It was argued by the defendant that each of
these steps was an inference and had to be proved by fact and not estab-
lished by inferences drawn from previous inferences.
2. (Mo. App. 1941) 149 S. W. (2d) 393.
3. Wright v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America (1915)
188 Mo. App. 457, 174 S. W. 833; Atherton v. Railway Mail Ass'n (Mo.
App. 1920) 221 S. W. 752; Phillips v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1921) 288 Mo.
175, 231 S. W. 947; Cardinale v. Kemp (1925) 309 Mo. 241, 274 S. W. 437;
Harding v. Federal Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 34 S. W. (2d) 198;
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the number of inferences which could be drawn in a single case or from
a single group of facts, so long as each inference was based independently
of all other inferences, upon those facts.4 The rule seems to have been
applied in all types of cases, civil and criminal.5
The applicability of the rule was apparently questioned by the Missouri
court for the first time in Wills v. Berbeich's Delivery Co.6 In that case
the supreme court held that the rule against basing an inference upon an
inference should no longer be regarded as a strict rule to be followed in
all cases, but as a rule of reason governing only when the proven facts and
their reasonable implications were insufficient for a reasonable conclusion
of fact; that the underlying and all important question was not whether
an inference had been based upon an inference, but whether the ultimate
conclusion could fairly be drawn from the proven facts by reasonable minds.7
Although the decision in the Wills case was the first open recognition of
the fallacy in the rule, it is doubtful whether the rule has ever served any
purpose except to afford the courts a convenient method of disposing of
evidence which they regarded as too remote or uncertain to prove the ulti-
mate facts in issue.8 Such a limitation is, by its very nature, incapable of
consistent application.9 Although the rule was apparently discarded in the
Hasenjaeger v. M. K. T. R. R. (1932) 227 Mo. App. 413, 53 S. W. (2d)
1083; Bollinger v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. (1934) 334 Mo. 720, 67
S. W. (2d) 985; Raw v. Maddox (1936) 230 Mo. App. 515, 93 S. W. (2d)
282; Morris v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1937) 341 Mo. 821, 109
S. W. (2d) 1222.
4. Morris v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1937) 341 Mo. 821, 109
S. W. (2d) 1222.
5. Phillips v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1921) 288 Mo. 175, 231 S. W. 947;
State v. Capps (1925) 311 Mo. 683, 278 S. W. 695.
6. (1939) 345 Mo. 616, 134 S. W. (2d) 125.
7. In State ex rel. Mulcahy v. Hostetter (1940) 346 Mo. 65, 139 S. W.
(2d) 939 dismissing certiorari of Mulcahy v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n (Mo.
App. 1939) 123 S. W. (2d) 235, the court, although it disposed of the case
upon a different ground, approved the principle laid down in the Wills case.
8. If the cases are examined upon their facts it will be seen in nearly all
of them that what the court was really determining, was whether or not
all of the evidence taken together would justify the desired conclusion. If
so, then whether or not it was necessary to base an inference upon an
inference in order to reach that conclusion, the court would say in one way
or another that there was no necessity of piling inferences upon each other.
For example, in Freeman v. Kansas City Public Service Co. (Mo. App. 1930)
30 S. W. (2d) 176, the court, in an action for wrongful death of the plain-
tiff's husband, allowed a recovery on the basis of evidence as to the position
of the deceased's body as later found, and the condition of the fender of
the street car which might have indicated that the body had been dragged
along after having been hit. There were no eye witnesses. From these
circumstances it was inferred that the deceased was struck by the car, that
the accident was caused by the motorman's negligence in not having seen
deceased on or near the track, that the motorman could have avoided the
accident had he seen the deceased, and that death was caused by deceased's
having been struck by the car. True, the circumstances pointed to this con-
clusion, but it seems obvious that it was reached by a series of inferences,
one upon the other.
9. Wigmore has said that there can be no such rule against basing an
inference upon an inference. He reasons that if there were such a rule,
very few trials could be adequately prosecuted. Every chain of reasoning
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Wills case, it is to be noted that the St. Louis Court of Appeals in two
recent cases,' 0 again said, without qualification, that an inference might not
be based upon an inference to prove a fact. Neither the Wills case nor
the principal case was referred to in the opinions.
The court in the principal case, in holding that the plaintiff's evidence
was sufficient to make a prima facie case, even though the jury might
have to base an inference upon an inference in reaching the ultimate con-
clusion, recognizes the rule set out in the Wills case. It is hoped that in
the future this attitude toward the prohibition of an inference upon an
inference will prevail over the older idea. Regardless of the fact that the
rule against inferences is probably not given any real effect in most cases,
its mere repetition without explanation or basis is bad, and can lead to
nothing but confusion and uncertainty in the law. The limitation prescribed
in the Wills case will insure litigants against inferences based upon evi-
dence which is too remote or speculative, without the necessity of resorting
to the untenable "slogan" that an inference may not be based upon an
inference. The decision in the Wills case and that of the principal case
seem to be in line with other improvements in the application of the rules
of evidence by the Missouri Supreme Court, such as the ruling on expert
testimony in Scanlon v. Kansas City,"' and the elimination of impeachment
of witnesses by reputation for morality in State v. Willi m . 2
J. W. F.
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION-REFUSAL ov Ac-
CUSED TO ANswER QUESTIONS AFTER ARREsT-[Missouri].-Defendant was
indicted for felonious assault but was not found and arrested for more than
a year after the indictment was returned. After his arrest, defendant
refused to answer questions until he consulted his attorney. At the trial,
the chief of police, in response to questions put by the prosecutor, testified
to certain questions which had been asked the defendant after his arrest
and to the defendant's refusal to answer. Defendant was ccnvicted, and on
appeal the court held that while the testimony ought not to have been ad-
mitted, it was not incriminating, and the error was not reversible. On
rehearing, held: reversed, and new trial granted. The introduction in evi-
dence of defendant's statement that he would not talk until he consulted
his lawyer was reversible error as an infringement of defendant's right
against self-incrimination. State v. Dowling.'
may be broken down into a string of inferences, each drawn from former
inferences. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 434, §41. He says at page
436, "The judicial utterances that sanction the fallacious and impracticable
limitation, originally put forward without authority, must be taken as valid
only for the particular evidentiary facts therein ruled upon." For an analy-
sis of the cases of all jurisdictions, see Note (1935) 95 A. L. R. 162.
10. Mendenhall v. Neyer (Mo. App. 1941) 149 S. W. (2d) 366; Pape v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (Mo. App. 1941) 150 S. W. (2d) 569.
11. (1930) 325 Mo. 125, 28 S. W. (2d) 84.
12. (1935) 337 Mo. 884, 87 S. W. (2d) 175, 100 A. L. R. 1503.
1. (Mo. 1941) 154 S. W. (2d) 749. The first opinion was withdrawn by
the court, but some of the reasoning of that case is given by the court in
the instant case at page 754.
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